The recent years have exhibited a burst in the amount of collaborative activities among …rms selling complementary products. This paper aims at providing a rationale for such a large extent of collaboration ties among complementors. To this end, we analyze a game in which the two producers of a certain component have the possibility to form pairwise collaboration ties with each of the two producers of a complementary component. Once ties are formed, each of the four …rms decides how much to invest in improving the quality of the match with each possible complementor, under the assumption that a …rm with a collaboration link with a complementor puts some weight on the complementor's pro…t when making investment decisions. Once investment choices have taken place, all …rms choose prices for their respective components in a noncooperative manner. In equilibrium, …rms end up forming as many collaboration ties as it is possible, although they would all prefer a scenario where collaboration were forbidden. In addition, a social planner would also prefer such a scenario to the one arising in equilibrium. We show that the result that collaboration is ine¢ cient for …rms and society does not depend on whether collaboration ties are formed in an exclusive manner: in fact, exclusivity would only worsen the situation.
Introduction
The recent decades have witnessed a shift in the competitive paradigm in high-tech industries that is driven to a large extent by the increasing importance of product complementarity. Indeed, cooperation among …rms selling complementary products is playing a prominent role in industries such as consumer electronics, semiconductors or telecommunications. More generally, hardware-software industries have exhibited a surge in the extent of cooperation among producers of complementary goods with the aim of improving the interoperability of their respective products (see e.g. Moore 1996 , Gawer and Cusumano 2002 , Adner 2006 , Adner and Kapoor 2010 , Gawer and Henderson 2007 . 1 Building such innovation ecosystems (Adner 2006) with the producers of complementary goods seems to be the key competitive weapon in most high-tech industries, in which the notion of competition has been displaced by that of co-opetition (Brandenburger and Nalebu¤ 1996) . A noteworthy feature of collaboration with complementors (i.e., …rms selling products that complement each other from the point of view of consumers) is that it is not unusual for …rms to collaborate with several complementors that sell substitutes of each other. 2 A natural question that arises in these settings is whether such extensive collaboration is desirable from the standpoints of …rms and consumers. Intuitively, one would be tempted to think that collaboration in improving the interoperability of complementary products is e¢ cient both for the …rms involved, and in fact for society as a whole. The purpose of this paper is to show that this need not be the case. We argue that collaboration may result in equilibria in which both …rms and society are worse o¤ than when …rms do not collaborate with complementors. This holds regardless of whether collaboration ties are exclusive or not, under the assumption that collaboration with a complementor leads a …rm to care somewhat about the complementor's pro…t when deciding on its interoperability investments.
To formally analyze these issues, we consider a game played by two …rms X 1 and X 2 that sell components that (perfectly) complement those sold by …rms Y 1 and Y 2 (both of which are also engaged in the game). In this mix-and-match setting (Matutes and Regibeau 1988 and Economides 1989) , there are four systems that are contemplated by consumers when they make their purchase decisions:
The game that we study consists of three stages. In the …rst stage, each …rm decides 1 The interoperability of the components of which a composite good consists refers to their coherence to work together with each other as a sole system. This is largely related to the absence of con ‡icts arising from possible incompatibility issues. 2 To give concrete examples, mobile phone manufacturer Nokia allied …rst with Intel to develop the MeeGo operating system for smartphones, and later signed an agreement with Microsoft to support the Windows Phone operating system. In addition, the Intel Architecture Lab (IAL) was formed to foster investment in components complementary to Intel's microprocessors by …rms that many times competed against each other. whether to form a (pairwise) collaboration link with each of its possible complementors (collaboration among …rms selling substitute components of a system is not allowed). In the second stage, each …rm decides how much to invest in improving the interoperability of its component with each of its complementors. 3 It is assumed that a …rm that has formed a collaboration link with a complementor puts some weight on the complementor's pro…t when making investment decisions (e.g., a joint venture is formed). In the third and …nal stage, each …rm decides independently on the price of its component, given past interoperability investments of all the …rms involved in the game.
We …nd in this setting that the (unique) equilibrium collaboration network involves each …rm forming (pairwise) collaboration links with its two complementors. If collaboration ties can be formed only in an exclusive manner, then exactly the same forces (subject to the exclusivity restriction) imply that in equilibrium each …rm forms a collaboration link with just one of its complementors. In both the exclusive and non-exclusive settings, equilibria exhibit all …rms collaborating with at least one complementor, which seems to accord well with the empirical evidence on innovation ecosystems.
Although equilibrium outcomes seem quite intuitive, intuition may conceal the e¤ect of several forces that are working at the same time, and not necessarily in the same direction. Thus, two complementors that form a new collaboration link between them have an incentive to increase their investment in enhancing the interoperability with each other, thus mitigating free riding to some extent. In addition, a new collaboration tie between two complementors induces each to lower its investment in enhancing the interoperability with the complementor's rival. These two e¤ects conform to the intuition that one may have on the impact of a new collaboration link. However, the formation of a new collaboration tie not only a¤ects the incentives of the …rms that become collaborators but also a¤ects those of …rms not involved in the new collaboration relationship. We show that the strategic reactions elicited by a new collaboration link either make it even more appealing to form the link or are not as negative for collaborators so as to dissuade them from forming the link. 4 Factoring all the incentives, we then have that it is always desirable to form a new collaboration tie with a complementor with which a …rm does not have one. This rat race ends when no more ties are possible, and hence each …rm collaborates with as many complementors as it can.
In spite of the rat race underlying the unique equilibrium outcome, all …rms prefer the situation in which none collaborates with its complementors to that in which all collab- 3 Greater investment in the interoperability of two components is modeled as an enhancement in the (perceived) quality of the system comprising both components (e.g., the investment by X 1 in improving interoperability with component Y 2 is speci…c to Y 2 , and has no e¤ect on the interoperability of components X 1 and Y 1 ). 4 Put di¤erently, …rms not involved in the new collaboration tie strategically react by weakening or just slightly strengthening the systems in which the …rms involved in the new collaboration link do not participate. This is not enough to o¤set the positive e¤ect of mitigating free-riding that forming a new collaboration tie has. orate with them. Hence, the equilibrium outcome exhibits the features of a prisonner's dilemma. When a …rm collaborates with both complementors, it invests in enhancing interoperability with each as much as it would in the absence of any collaborative tie among …rms. 5 The reason is that bene…ting one of the complementors comes at the expense of harming the complementor's competitor, so the …rm adopts a neutral approach, and the situation is as if no …rm collaborated with any other …rm (except for the costs of collaboration). Thus, although a …rm would bene…t from its competitor committing not to collaborate with any complementors, it holds that all of them would be better o¤ if each could make such commitment. Not only do we …nd that collaboration is excessive from the point of view of …rms, but also from that of a social planner that can simply choose how many collaboration links should be formed. Our baseline model assumes that a …rm cares when making interoperability decisions about the entire pro…t made the complementors with which it collaborates. We show that results do not vary (actually, they are strengthened) if collaborating with another …rm entails caring only about the pro…t generated for such a …rm by the system in which both …rms participate.
Our result that R&D collaboration among complementors results in private and public ine¢ encies is in stark contrast with the result that R&D collaboration among …rms selling substitute goods may be desirable both for …rms and society, as shown in the seminal papers by D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992) . These papers do not consider whether a …rm has incentives to collaborate with other …rms, a limitation that has been overcome by subsequent work by Bloch (1995) using a coalitions approach, and more recently by Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) using a bilateral link formation approach. 6 Both of these papers show that excessive collaboration may arise in equilibrium. Although we also contend that equilibria displaying collaboration may be ine¢ cient, it is worth noting that the results in Bloch (1995) and Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) are derived for substitute goods, not for complementary goods, as is our focus.
Our paper also contributes to the literature analyzing strategic competition when there exists at least one complementor whose pricing activities interact with those of two …rms selling components that constitute substitutes for each other. This literature was pioneered by Economides and Salop (1992) as an extension of early work by Cournot (1838) , who analyzed the e¤ect of a merger of two monopolists that produce complemen- 5 A …rm may invest more in enhancing interoperability with each complementor than it would in the absence of any collaborative tie among …rms. This happens when collaborating with a complementor entails caring about the pro…t generated for such a complementor by the system comprising the two products sold by these …rms. 6 See Leahy and Neary (1997) for a generalization of the models in D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992) . See also Bloch (2005) for a comprehensive survey that covers strategic network formation games in settings with R&D activities. Finally, it is worth pointing out that Westbrock (2010) builds on Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) and Goyal and Joshi (2003) so as to analyze how asymmetric R&D networks may be socially e¢ cient if collaboration ties are somewhat costly to establish. tary goods.
The paper by Economides and Salop (1992) examines the e¤ect of cooperation in prices (i.e., a merger) between the two existing producers of one of the two components of which a system consists. They consider two scenarios, depending on whether or not the two producers of the complementary component are already cooperating in prices. In our work, we do not analyze price cooperation and, in fact, …rms always choose prices noncooperatively regardless of the structure of the collaboration network. The network architecture does have an e¤ect on cooperation in R&D activities, though. 7 Our paper is also related to recent work by Casadesus-Masanell, Nalebu¤ and Yo¢ e (2008). Their paper provides conditions under which a …rm may bene…t from having a new competitor enter with a substitute good whenever there exists a complementor for both the …rm under consideration and its new competitor. Our framework di¤ers in that it does not focus on the e¤ects of entry on co-opetive settings, as they do, but rather it examines the incentives to form collaboration links and to invest in enhancing interoperability among complementors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the game we consider. Section 3 characterizes the e¢ ciency properties of the unique equilibrium of the game under the assumption that a …rm can form any desired number of collaboration links with its complementors. Section 4 examines how results are a¤ected if collaboration ties are assumed to be exclusive. Section 5 shows that results are strengthened in the more realistic case in which collaborating with another …rm entails caring just about the pro…t generated for such a …rm by the system in which both …rms participate. Section 6 concludes.
The model
We de…ne a system as a pair of perfectly complementary goods such as hardware and software. The two perfect complements giving rise to a system are called components X and Y . It is assumed that there are two …rms costlessly producing component X, X 1 and X 2 , and two …rms costlessly producing component Y , Y 1 and Y 2 . 8 As a result, there are n = 4 systems:
can be bought by any consumer at price p i;j = p X i + p Y j , where p X i and p Y j respectively denote the prices at which components X i and Y j are sold. Whenever there is no risk of confusion, we will 7 There is a recent literature on (pure and mixed) bundling by …rms that produce two perfectly complementary components in competition with …rms that produce just one of these components (see e.g. Denicolò 2000 and Choi 2008 ). The reason why this stream of research building on Economides and Salop (1992) is not related to our work is that we do not consider bundling, an issue that certainly deserves a separate analysis beyond the scope of our paper. 8 That production is costless is without loss of generality if the marginal cost of production is constant and the …xed costs of operation are not too large.
write p ij instead of p i;j for system X i Y j . Also, …rms X 1 and X 2 are typically referred to as the complementors of …rms Y 1 and Y 2 , and vice versa.
It is assumed that there exists a unit mass of consumers willing to buy at most one system. System X i Y j is assumed to create a gross utility of v i ; j to any consumer (again, we will typically write v ij instead of v i ; j ). The gross utility v ij is largely the outcome of choices by …rms X i and Y j . More speci…cally, for some given scalar v > 0, we have that v ij = v + k j i + e i j , where k j i is …rm X i 's R&D investment in improving the quality of the match with …rm Y j 's component and e i j is …rm Y j 's R&D investment in improving the quality of the match with …rm X i 's component. 9 Thus, the investment variables k j i and e i j a¤ect the vertical attributes of system X i Y j . Given their system-speci…city, they can be viewed as investments in improving the interoperability of components X i and Y j , although other interpretations are possible and may be more appealing depending on the context.
Besides (possibly) being vertically di¤erentiated, systems are perceived by consumers as being horizontally di¤erentiated in an exogenous manner. To model consumer preferences over horizontally di¤erentiated systems, we follow Chen and Riordan (2007) in using their "spokes" model of nonlocalized di¤erentiation. Thus, each system is represented by a point at the origin of a line of length 1=2, a line which is denoted by l X i Y j for system X i Y j (i; j = 1; 2). The other end of a line is called its terminal, and it is assumed that the terminals of all lines meet at a point called the center (see Figure 1 ). All the existing consumers are uniformly distributed along the four lines. A consumer who is located on line
0 is a unit transportation cost. The same consumer must incur transportation cost t(1 d X i Y j ) when purchasing any other system (since l X i Y j = 1=2 for all i; j = 1; 2). It is assumed that X i Y j is the preferred system for any consumer on l X i Y j , and any other system has probability 1=(n 1) = 1=3 of constituting the benchmark against which X i Y j is to be compared by a consumer on l X i Y j . A system that is not deemed as preferred or as a benchmark for a consumer is assumed to yield no utility to such a consumer. This assumption completes the description of the spokes model we use for modeling the horizontal attributes of systems. 10 Figure 1 : The Spoke Model @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @
Given these features of …rms and consumers, we study a three-stage game. In the …rst stage, …rms X i (i = 1; 2) simultaneously form pairwise collaboration links with …rms Y j (j = 1; 2). We let g ij = 2 (0; 1] if a collaboration link between X i and Y j is formed and g ij = 0 otherwise, with the convention that g ji = g ij . In addition, g ij = implies that both …rms X i and Y j bear an arbitrarily small cost " > 0. We denote the network (i.e., the set of collaboration links) by g, that is, g = fg 11 ; g 12 ; g 21 ; g 22 g 2 f0; g 4 . Note that in principle we allow a …rm to form more than one collaboration link with its complementors (e.g., it may be possible that g i1 = g i2 = for some i 2 f1; 2g). The parameter intends to capture how much a …rm cares about a collaborator's (net) pro…t when …rms choose investment levels in the second stage. We let = 1 to simplify computations, but insights and results do not vary qualitatively if 2 (0; 1).
In the second stage of the game we consider, we assume that …rm X i chooses k j i at the same time as …rm Y j chooses e i j (i; j = 1; 2). Investments of k 1 i and k 2 i by …rm X i result in an R&D cost equal to
whereas investments of e 1 j and e 2 j by …rm Y j result in an R&D cost equal to C Y j (e 1 j ; e 2 j ) = (e 1 j ) 2 + (e 2 j ) 2 . It is assumed throughout that g ij = implies that both …rms X i and Y j choose their investments in improving their match quality in a (somewhat) cooperative manner. By this, we mean that each also cares to some extent about the investment cost borne by the collaborator and the pro…t that the collaborator will make in the product market. There are many formal or informal arrangements that may lead a …rm that collaborates with a complementor to care about the complementor's payo¤ when making investment decisions. Reasons range from research alliances (or collusive R&D cartels) to relational capital concerns in ongoing relationships between …rms that need each other. (Sometimes, the motives that foster cooperation with a complementor may also preclude a …rm from collaborating with the complementor's competitor; this is the reason why we will examine equilibria when arrangements are exclusive in a later section.)
In the third and last stage, prices p X i and p Y j are set simultaneously in the standard noncooperative manner, and consumers make their purchase decisions given p ij for i; j = 1; 2.
The solution concept is the same as in Goyal and Moraga-González (2001). Thus, for each possible g, we will look for subgame perfect Nash equilibria, which will give equilibrium payo¤s given g. In order to solve for the equilibrium network structure in the …rst stage, we will use the pairwise stability notion proposed by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . This concept is very weak, and aims at capturing (possibly) complex communication and negotiation activities that would be hard to capture through noncooperative game theory.
Introducing the concept of pairwise stability requires some notation. In particular, we let g g ij denote the network that results from suppressing the collaboration link between …rms X i and Y j in network g. We also let g + g ij denote the network that results from adding a collaboration link between …rms X i and Y j in network g. Denoting the equilibrium payo¤s (gross of ") obtained by …rm X i and Y j given network g by X i (g) and Y j (g), network g would be pairwise stable if the following two conditions held for all
The …rst condition requires that neither X i nor Y j have an incentive to unilaterally break their collaboration relationship (provided it exists). In turn, the second condition requires that, if …rms X i and Y j are not linked to each other, then a desire by X i to form a collaboration link with Y j should not be reciprocal. It is worth noting that the results we derive still hold if the network is required to be pairwise Nash stable, that is, if a …rm is allowed to unilaterally break more than one collaboration link at a time.
3 Resolution of the model
Third stage
As is standard, we solve the last two stages of the game by working backwards. So assume that …rst-stage and second-stage choices lead to a gross valuation of v ij for system X i Y j , i; j = 1; 2. We …rst derive the demand functions for each system and then we …nd out pro…ts attained by each …rm as a function of fv 11 ; v 12 ; v 21 ; v 22 g. It is assumed throughout that v is large enough so that the market is always fully covered and all …rms make positive sales. If collaboration between …rms X i and Y j drove a system in which none of them participates out of the market, then there would be an additional incentive to form collaboration links. It is in this sense that we make the weakest case for collaboration to take place, and still …nd that it emerges in equilibrium.
In order to characterize the demand functions of each system, let
we establish the convention that i i 0 and j j 0 . 11 To …nd out the demand for system X 1 Y 1 , consider a consumer who happens to be on l
This occurs either because X 1 Y 1 is her preferred system and X 1 Y 2 is the benchmark, or because X 1 Y 2 is her preferred system and X 1 Y 1 is the benchmark. The consumer will be indi¤erent between both systems if her distance d 12 11 2 [0; 1] from X 1 Y 1 is given by v 11 p 11 td 12 11 = v 12 p 12 t(1 d 12 11 ), 12 that is, if
Because the measure of consumers between the locations of systems X 1 Y 1 and X 1 Y 2 is 2=n, we then have that the number of consumers who prefer X 1 Y 1 over X 1 Y 2 given p 11 and p 12 is 2d 12 11 =n. Similarly, the number of consumer who prefer
Conditional upon X 1 Y 1 being the preferred system or the benchmark one, we have that
have each probability 1=(n 1) = 1=3 of being the system with respect to which X 1 Y 1 is to be assessed by consumers. It then follows that demand for
.
Simple algebra yields that
Similar steps lead to the following demand for system X i Y j (i; j = 1; 2):
Recalling that p i;j = p X i + p Y j and letting Q X i Q i1 + Q i2 denote X i 's demand, we 11 Observe from the de…nition of l XiYj + l X i 0 Y j 0 that i 6 = i 0 or j 6 = j 0 or both, so we cannot have both i = i 0 and j = j 0 . 12 Recall that the set l X1Y1 + l X1Y2 has unit (Lebesgue) measure.
have that
We have made the arguments of Q X i explicit to highlight that the volume of sales by …rm X i does not depend on how any complementary product is priced. Under full market coverage, di¤erent prices by Y 1 and Y 2 just a¤ect with which component X i wishes to be matched, but …rm X i 's demand solely depends on p X i and p X 3 i . One can similarly …nd out that
, respectively. Using the strict concavity of pro…t functions, we have that the solution to the following system delivers the equilibrium prices for …rms X 1 and X 2 :
and
The system consisting of equations (1) and (2) has the following solution:
Similarly, one can show that
We then have that the sales of system X i Y j are
we can write it as a function of second-stage choices:
Similarly, the pro…t that system X i Y j generates for …rm Y j can be written as follows:
Y j respectively denote the overall pro…ts made by …rms X i and Y j , it is easy to show that
The following is worth noting for i; j = 1; 2:
Essentially, a …rm's incentive to invest in enhancing the match quality with any one of its complementors becomes less intense as there is less investment in any of the systems in which the …rm participates. This incentive is also weakened as there is more investment in any of the systems in which it does not participate. Remark 1 will be heavily used in what follows, together with the following one that applies to the cases in which two complementors collaborate with each other:
Similarly,
We now have that a …rm's incentive to invest in enhancing the match quality with any one of its complementors becomes less intense as there is less investment in the system in which both …rms participate. This incentive is also weakened as there is more investment in the system in which neither of them participates.
We also have that the following holds when a …rm collaborates with both of its complementors: Remark 3 For i; j = 1; 2,
Intuitively, we now have that …rm X i 's incentive to invest in enhancing the match quality with Y j becomes less intense as there is less investment in the systems in which …rm Y j participates (especially in system X i Y j ). This incentive is also weakened as there is more investment in the systems in which Y j does not participate (especially in system
To build intuition for the subsequent analysis, note that, in principle, collaboration between two complementors has two direct e¤ects. On the one hand, collaborators internalize the positive externality that each imposes on the other, and as a result each invests more in enhancing the quality of the match with the other. We call this the "forget-free-riding" e¤ect. On the other hand, collaboration between two complementors induces each to invest less in enhancing the quality of the match with its complementor's rival. We call this the "harm-my-competitor" e¤ect of collaboration. In the light of Remarks 1, 2 and 3, the "forget-free-riding" and "harm-my-competitor" e¤ects arising from a collaborative link also have several strategic e¤ects whose nature and extent depends on the existing collaboration network. What follows is an analysis of the interaction of these multiple e¤ects for diverse collaborative structures under the assumption that = 1. When 2 (0; 1), the existing e¤ects are softened, but do not disappear, so the insights are qualitatively the same (proof available upon request).
Second and …rst stages
We now consider the investment subgames for each of the possible network structures arising from the …rst stage. Up to a relabeling of …rms, there are six network structures that should be considered (see Figure 2 ): g 1 f0; 0; 0; 0g, g 2 f1; 0; 0; 0g, g 3 f1; 0; 0; 1g, g 4 f1; 1; 0; 0g, g 5 f1; 1; 0; 1g and g 6 f1; 1; 1; 1g. Besides characterizing equilibrium play for each, we also show which one emerges as the unique (pairwise) stable network, thus e¤ectively providing a complete resolution of the network formation game. 
We start by analyzing simple network structures, which means that no …rm has more than one collaboration link (i.e., g = g 1 , or g = g 2 , or g = g 3 ). We then analyze more complex network structures (i.e., g = g 4 , or g = g 5 , or g = g 6 ). At this point, it is useful to recall our behavioral assumptions, so let us de…ne the following functions to this end:
Given network architecture g, we then have that …rm X i (i = 1; 2) chooses k 1 i 0 and
where we have suppressed the arguments of the functions to avoid clutter. We also recall that all second-stage choices are made simultaneously. Lastly, we note that we will avoid equilibrium inexistence by making t large enough. 13 
Simple network structures
We …rst consider network g = g 1 f0; 0; 0; 0g, so …rm X i (i = 1; 2) maximizes X i , whereas …rm Y j (j = 1; 2) maximizes Y j . We assume that t > 1=54 to make payo¤ functions strictly concave. We then have that the unique equilibrium is symmetric, and it is characterized by each …rm investing k j i (g 1 ) = e 1 j (g 1 ) = 1=12 (i; j = 1; 2) in trying to (unilaterally) improve the match with each complementary component. Equilibrium pro…ts for g = g 1 are
which are positive for t > 1=54.
Recalling that we have assumed that = 1, we now turn to the case in which there is just one collaboration link, i.e., g = g 2 f1; 0; 0; 0g. In this case, …rms X 1 and Y 1 maximize joint pro…ts X 1 + Y 1 . In turn, …rm X 2 maximizes X 2 , whereas …rm Y 2 maximizes Y 2 . If one makes the assumption for g = g 2 that t > 4=54 to ensure that payo¤ functions are strictly concave and investment levels are positive, it holds that the unique equilibrium is characterized by the following investments in match quality:
, k 2 1 (g 2 ) = e 2 1 (g 2 ) = 0 and k 1 2 (g 2 ) = k 2 2 (g 2 ) = e 1 2 (g 2 ) = e 2 2 (g 2 ) = 27t 2 18(18t 1)
. Equilibrium pro…ts for g = g 2 are then
All pro…ts are positive for t > 2=54, so our assumption that t > 4=54 su¢ ces for making pro…ts positive. It can also be shown that it is su¢ cient for making equilibrium quantities of each system positive, as required by the full market coverage assumption we have made.
We are now in a position to prove the following result.
Lemma 1 Network g = g 1 cannot arise in equilibrium for t > 4=54.
Proof. Noting that g 2 = g 1 + g 11 , it holds that X 1 (g 2 ) = Y 1 (g 2 ) > Y 1 (g 1 ) = X 1 (g 1 ) for t > 4=54. For small enough " > 0, it then follows that X 1 (g 2 ) " X 1 (g 1 ) does not imply that Y 1 (g 2 ) " < Y 1 (g 1 ), and hence g = g 1 cannot be a stable network.
The result follows because both …rms X 1 and Y 1 would bene…t from forming a collaboration tie if the network were g = g 1 . To understand why this happens, note that, relative to the case in which g = g 1 , there arise several incentives for …rms X 1 and Y 1 if g = g 2 . The harm-my-competitor e¤ect leads them to decrease k 2 1 and e 2 1 . 14 In addition, the forget-free-riding e¤ect leads to higher k 1 1 and e 1 1 . Overall, both k 1 1 and e 1 1 end up increasing relative to the case in which g = g 1 , whereas k 2 1 and e 2 1 are both reduced as much as possible. By Remark 1, the lower k 2 1 has a positive marginal impact on …rm X 2 's payo¤, whereas the lower e 2 1 has a negative impact on …rm X 2 's marginal payo¤. Taking into account that both of these e¤ects cancel out and that system X 1 Y 1 is stronger, it follows from Remark 1 that …rm X 2 prefers to lower k 1 2 . The lower k 1 2 + e 2 1 implies that X 2 Y 1 is weakened, which coupled with the fact that X 1 Y 1 is stronger, induces …rm X 2 to reduce k 2 2 . Firm X 2 equally bene…ts from investing in the match with Y 1 or Y 2 , so we must have that both k 1 2 and k 2 2 are reduced by the same amount because the strict convexity of R&D costs implies that it is more e¢ cient to spread e¤ort over two complementors rather than just one. Analogous incentives for …rm Y 2 imply that both e 1 2 and e 2 2 are lowered by the same amount.
In short, the result that X 1 and Y 1 can mutually bene…t from forming a link with each other is largely driven by the forget-free-riding and harm-my-competitor e¤ects, as well as the positive strategic e¤ects that these direct e¤ects have on noncollaborating …rms.
We conclude this subsection by analyzing what happens if each …rm has one, and only one, collaboration link, i.e., g = g 3 f1; 0; 0; 1g. Then …rms X i and Y j (i; j = 1; 2; i = j) maximize their joint payo¤, X i + Y j . Under the assumption that t > 1=54, all payo¤ functions are strictly concave, and the unique equilibrium is symmetric, and it is characterized by the following investments in match quality: k 1 1 (g 3 ) = k 2 2 (g 3 ) = e 1 1 (g 3 ) = e 2 2 (g 3 ) = 1=6 and k 2 1 (g 3 ) = k 1 2 (g 3 ) = e 2 1 (g 3 ) = e 1 2 (g 3 ) = 0. Equilibrium pro…ts for g = g 3 are
which are positive for t > 2=54. However, we make the somewhat stronger condition that t > 12=54 in order to make quantity sold of each system positive in equilibrium. We then have all the elements to rule out g = g 2 as an equilibrium outcome.
Lemma 2 Network g = g 2 cannot arise in equilibrium for t > 12=54.
Proof. Noting that g 3 = g 2 + g 22 , it holds that
. For small enough " > 0, it then follows that X 2 (g 3 ) " X 2 (g 2 ) does not imply that Y 2 (g 3 ) " < Y 2 (g 2 ), and hence g = g 2 cannot be a stable network.
Starting from g = g 2 , let us consider the incentive for …rms X 2 and Y 2 to form a tie, an incentive that is somewhat similar to the one that …rms X 1 and Y 1 to form a link 14 Notice by Remark 1 that the decrease in k 2 1 creates an incentive to decrease k 1 1 , whereas the lower e 2 1 stimulates higher k 1 1 . Because k 2 1 and e 2 1 have the same impact on …rm X 1 's marginal payo¤, both e¤ects o¤set each other, and hence there is no incentive for X 1 to change k 1 1 . A similar argument explains why …rm Y 1 has no incentive to change e 1 1 .
starting from g = g 1 . The harm-my-competitor leads them to decrease k 1 2 and e 1 2 , whereas the forget-free-riding e¤ect leads to higher k 2 2 and e 2 2 . Overall, both k 2 2 and e 2 2 end up increasing relative to the case in which g = g 2 , whereas k 1 2 and e 1 2 are both reduced as much as possible. We now turn to how …rms X 1 and Y 1 react. In choosing k 1 1 , …rm X 1 does not care about system X 2 Y 1 because of its collaboration with …rm Y 1 (by Remark 2), so the fact that system X 2 Y 2 becomes stronger induces it to lower k 1 1 relative to the case in which g = g 2 . In addition, the fact that system X 1 Y 2 is weakened creates a pressure towards lowering k 2 1 , but there arises a tension to increase k 2 1 as X 2 Y 1 becomes weaker (by Remark 2). Because both e¤ects cancel out, k 2 1 remains at the same level as when g = g 2 . A closely similar analysis explains why …rm Y 1 reduces e 1 1 and leaves e 2 1 unchanged. In short, g 2 is not a stable network because …rms X 2 and Y 2 would mutually bene…t from forming a link. This incentive to form a link arises because of the forget-freeriding and harm-my-competitor e¤ects, as well as the the positive strategic e¤ect of their collaboration. Thus, …rms X 1 and Y 1 reduce their investment in each other, and leave unchanged the investments in enhancing the match with the complementors with which they do not collaborate.
Complex network structures
We now deal with network structures in which at least one …rm has more than one collaboration link. We start by analyzing g = g 4 f1; 1; 0; 0g. Firm X 1 maximizes
Given that we focus throughout on large enough t, the unique equilibrium in this case happens to be noninterior. 15 In particular, we assume that t > 5=54 to ensure that payo¤s are strictly concave as well as the non-negativity of equilibrium pro…ts, investment levels and quantities sold. Then we have that k 1 1 (g 4 ) = k 2 1 (g 4 ) = 54t 1 36(18t 1) ,
, e 2 1 (g 4 ) = e 2 2 (g 4 ) = 0 and e 1 1 (g 4 ) = e 1 2 (g 4 ) = 27t 1 9(18t 1)
. As for equilibrium pro…ts for g = g 4 , they are To get some understanding of what is going on, let us take the case in which g = g 2 as a benchmark of the current situation. Relative to g = g 2 , k 2 1 and e 1 2 increase (owing to the forget-free-riding e¤ect), which leads to slightly higher e 2 2 by Remark 2. In addition, relative to g = g 2 , k 1 1 and e 2 2 decrease because of the harm-my-competitor e¤ect, an e¤ect that also creates some pressure towards slightly lower e 1 2 in the light of Remark 2. So, overall, we have that k 2 1 and e 1 2 increase and k 1 1 and e 2 2 decrease relative to the case in which g = g 2 .
After analyzing how collaboration a¤ects those directly involved, we now turn to analyzing the competitive reaction when going from network g = g 2 to g = g 4 . By Remark 1, the lower k 1 1 has a positive marginal impact on …rm X 2 's payo¤, whereas the lower e 2 2 has a negative impact on …rm X 2 's marginal payo¤. Both of these e¤ects cancel out, so the fact that system X 1 Y 2 is stronger implies by Remark 1 that …rm X 2 prefers to lower k 2 2 . The decrease in k 2 2 + e 2 2 , together with the stronger X 1 Y 2 , induces …rm X 2 to reduce k 1 2 too (as per Remark 1). The change in …rm Y 1 's behavior is more complex, though. Firm Y 1 does not care about system X 1 Y 2 becoming stronger because it collaborates with …rm X 1 . However, the lower k 1 1 creates a tension to decrease e 1 1 , which is exacerbated after taking into account that …rm Y 1 cares about …rm X 1 's pro…t. The lower e 2 2 creates pressure to increase e 1 1 , though, a pressure accentuated because Y 1 cares about …rm X 1 's pro…t. Because the tensions to increase and decrease e 1 1 o¤set each other, e 1 1 ends up not changing relative to g = g 2 . Furthermore, the fact that …rm Y 1 cares about …rm X 1 's pro…t implies that it does not care about systems X 1 Y 1 and X 2 Y 2 becoming weaker or stronger when it comes to choosing e 2 1 . Because system X 1 Y 2 is stronger, there arises a tension to lower e 2 1 relative to the case in which g = g 2 . As a result, e 2 1 is kept at its minimum possible level, namely zero.
We analyze now the cases in which g = g 5 f1; 1; 0; 1g. Firm X 1 maximizes
In this case, the unique equilibrium that exists with all …rms active is noninterior, and it requires that t be su¢ ciently large. 16 More precisely, we let t > 6=54, which guarantees that payo¤s are strictly concave and that equilibrium pro…ts, investment levels and quantities sold are all non-negative. Solving for an equilibrium then yields k 1 1 (g 5 ) = e 2 2 (g 5 ) = 27t 2 18(18t 1)
, k 2 1 (g 5 ) = e 1 2 (g 5 ) = 3t 2(18t 1) , k 1 2 (g 5 ) = e 2 1 (g 5 ) = 0 and k 2 2 (g 5 ) = e 1 1 (g 5 ) = 1 6
. As for pro…ts in equilibrium for g = g 5 , 16 Equilibrium inexistence for t that is not large enough also happens when g = g 6 . The proof is available upon request. they are
We then have enough elements to discard g = g 3 as an equilibrium outcome.
Lemma 3 Network g = g 3 cannot arise in equilibrium for t > 12=54.
Proof. Noting that g 5 = g 3 + g 12 , it holds that
. For small enough " > 0, it then follows that X 1 (g 5 ) 2"
, and hence g = g 3 cannot be a stable network.
We now provide an intuitive explanation so as to understand what changes when …rms X 1 and Y 2 form an extra link in g = g 3 in order to give rise to network con…guration g = g 5 . As usual, the forget-free-riding e¤ect increases k 2 1 and e 1 2 , but no incentive to vary k 1 1 or e 2 2 arises as a result of these changes. 17 In turn, the harm-my-competitor e¤ect decreases k 1 1 and e 2 2 , and again there arises no incentive to vary k 2 1 or e 1 2 . Consequently, k 2 1 and e 1 2 are higher and k 1 1 and e 2 2 are lower under g = g 3 than under g = g 5 . The lower k 1 1 induces …rm Y 1 to decrease e 1 1 , but the fact that system X 2 Y 2 is weaker induces it to increase e 1 1 . 18 Because both e¤ects cancel out, e 1 1 …nally does not change relative to g = g 3 . In addition, the fact that system X 1 Y 2 is stronger creates a tension to lower e 2 1 below its level under g = g 3 , namely zero, so …rm Y 1 chooses not to vary e 2 1 either. Using a similar argument for …rm X 2 explains why k 1 2 and k 2 2 remain at the same level as in the case in which g = g 3 .
In short, adding a link between X 1 and Y 2 in network g = g 3 has no strategic e¤ect, so the result is all driven by the positive direct e¤ects of collaboration.
Not only can g = g 3 be discarded as an equilibrium outcome, but also g = g 4 can be ruled out.
Lemma 4 Network g = g 4 cannot arise in equilibrium for t > 6=54.
Proof. Noting that g 5 = g 4 + g 22 , it holds that X 2 (g 5 ) > X 2 (g 4 ) and Y 2 (g 5 ) > Y 2 (g 4 ) for t > 6=54. For small enough " > 0, it then follows that X 2 (g 5 ) "
X 2 (g 4 ) 17 Note by Remark 2 that @ 2 ( X1 + Y1 ) @k 1 1 @k 2 1 = @ 2 ( X1 + Y1 ) @k 1 1 @e 1 2 = 0 and @ 2 ( Y2 + X1 ) @e 2 2 @e 1 2 = @ 2 ( Y2 + X1 ) @e 2 2 @k 2 1 = 0.
18 Note that the fact that X 1 Y 2 is weaker is not viewed as something that stimulates higher e 1 1 because …rm Y 1 also cares about X 1 's pro…t, and …rm X 1 would like to lower e 1 1 if X 1 Y 2 became weaker for some reason.
does not imply that Y 2 (g 5 ) 2" < Y 2 (g 4 ) ", and hence g = g 4 cannot be a stable network.
We now explain why …rms X 2 and Y 2 have an incentive to form a link in g = g 4 in order to give rise to network g = g 5 . On the one hand, the forget-free-riding e¤ect leads to higher k 2 2 and e 2 2 , which creates a pressure towards slightly increasing k 1 2 even though e 1 2 remains invariant. On the other hand, the harm-my-competitor e¤ect leads to lower k 1 2 and e 1 2 , which results in slightly lower k 2 2 even though e 2 2 remains invariant. Overall, k 2 2 and e 2 2 increase, whereas k 1 2 and e 1 2 decrease. In the light of Remark 3, the facts that system X 2 Y 2 becomes stronger and X 2 Y 1 becomes weaker induce …rm X 1 to lower k 1 1 relative to g = g 4 (despite the reduction in e 1 2 weakens system X 1 Y 2 , which creates an incentive to increase k 1 1 ). In addition, …rm X 1 increases k 2 1 because of the stronger X 2 Y 2 and weaker X 2 Y 1 , despite the reduction in e 1 2 creates some incentive to lower lower k 2 1 . In turn, …rm Y 1 has an incentive to lower e 1 1 because of the reduction in k 1 1 and the stronger system X 2 Y 2 , as stems from Remark 2. However, …rm Y 1 does not care about system X 2 Y 2 when choosing how to vary e 2 1 , but the lower k 2 1 and e 1 2 induce it to reduce e 2 1 , as does the lower k 1 2 . Because e 2 1 cannot be diminished below zero, it remains unchanged at zero.
In short, the forget-free-riding and harm-my-competitor e¤ects create an incentive for …rms X 2 and Y 2 to form a new link starting from network g = g 4 . In addition, their respective competitors react by weakening system X 1 Y 1 and strengthening X 1 Y 2 , so the strategic e¤ect is positive for …rm X 2 and has an ambiguous sign for …rm Y 2 (recall that Y 2 cares about X 1 's pro…t). Overall, however, …rms X 2 and Y 2 mutually bene…t from forming a link, and hence g = g 4 cannot be stable.
We deal now with the …nal network that needs to be considered, namely g = g 6 f1; 1; 1; 1g. Firm X i (i = 1; 2) maximizes X i + Y 1 + Y 2 , whereas …rm Y j maximizes
Under the assumption that t > 1=54 (which ensures payo¤ concavity and non-negativity of the relevant variables), the unique equilibrium is symmetric and involves the following investment levels: k j i (g 6 ) = e i j (g 6 ) = 1=12 (i; j = 1; 2). Equilibrium pro…ts for g = g 6 are
which are positive for t > 1=54. Using these pro…ts, we can rule out g = g 5 as an equilibrium network.
Lemma 5 Network g = g 5 cannot arise in equilibrium for t > 6=54.
Proof. Noting that g 6 = g 5 + g 21 , it holds that X 2 (g 6 ) > X 2 (g 5 ) and Y 1 (g 6 ) > Y 1 (g 5 ) for t > 6=54. For small enough " > 0, it then follows that X 2 (g 6 ) 2" X 2 (g 5 ) " does not imply that Y 1 (g 6 ) 2" < Y 1 (g 5 ) ", and hence g = g 5 cannot be a stable network.
We provide the intuition for why …rms X 2 and Y 1 would like to be linked to each other starting from g = g 5 . On the one hand, the forget-free-riding e¤ect results in higher k 1 2 and e 2 1 , and no tension arises to vary either k 2 2 or e 1 1 . On the other, the harm-my-competitor e¤ect results in lower k 2 2 and e 1 1 , and no tension arises to vary either k 1 2 or e 2 1 . Hence, we have that k 1 2 and e 2 1 increase relative to g = g 5 , but k 2 2 and e 1 1 decrease. Based on Remark 3, the facts that system X 2 Y 1 becomes stronger and X 2 Y 2 becomes weaker induce …rm X 1 to increase k 1 1 relative to g = g 5 (despite the reduction in e 1 1 weakens system X 1 Y 1 , which creates an incentive to lower k 1 1 ). In addition, …rm X 1 lowers k 2 1 because of the stronger X 2 Y 1 and weaker X 2 Y 2 , despite the reduction in e 1 1 creates some incentive to raise k 2 1 . One can similarly explain why e 1 2 is reduced, but e 2 2 turns out to increase. The fact that X i (g 6 ) 2" > X i (g 5 ) " for i = 1; 2 and Y j (g 6 ) 2" > Y j (g 5 ) " for j = 1; 2 implies that g = g 6 is an equilibrium network for t > 6=54. This result, together with all the above Lemmata, leads to our …rst result.
Proposition 1 For t > 12=54, the unique equilibrium network structure is the complete network, namely g = f1; 1; 1; 1g. In equilibrium, …rm X i chooses to invest k j i (g ) = 1=12 in improving the quality of its match with complementor Y j , whereas …rm Y j chooses to invest e i j (g ) = 1=12 in improving the quality of its match with complementor X i (i; j = 1; 2). Each …rm earns a payo¤ of (54t 1)=72 2".
We recall at this point that we have used the notion of pairwise stability as our solution concept for the strategic network formation game we consider. In the context of our game, the main drawback of this solution concept has to do with the possibility that a …rm with several links may want to sever more than one link at a time. 19 However, this criticism does not apply to the game under consideration. Indeed, the fact that X 2 (g 6 ) 2" > X 2 (g 4 ) for small " > 0 implies that the complete network is stable even if the pairwise stability solution concept is augmented to allow for the deletion of several links at a time (the complete network is then said to be pairwise Nash stable).
We study from now on the e¢ ciency properties of the complete network and the competitive play it implies. Taking into account that forming a collaboration link costs " > 0 and k j i (g) = e i j (g) = 1=12 (i; j = 1; 2) for both g = g 1 and g = g , we have just proved the following result about the desirability of the equilibrium outcome. Proposition 2 For t > 12=54, the unique equilibrium network g = f1; 1; 1; 1g is socially suboptimal and results in a payo¤ for each …rm smaller than that achieved when g = f0; 0; 0; 0g.
Hence, …rms (and society) would do better if they could commit not to collaborate, since collaboration is costly and it cannot improve upon the case in which each …rm acts uncoordinatedly. This result follows because the positive marginal impact on …rm Y j 's pro…t of an increase in k j i is completely o¤set by the negative marginal impact on …rm Y 3 j 's pro…t. So the fact that both of …rm X i 's collaborators compete with each other implies that …rm X i 's choice of k j i does not depend on how such choice a¤ects both of its collaborators. In consequence, …rm X i behaves in the same way as when it does not collaborate with either of them. An analogous reasoning explains why …rm Y j 's choice of e i j is the same both for g = g 1 and for g = g . The existence of opportunity costs of forming collaboration links then …nally provides the explanation why …rms and society would be better o¤ without collaboration.
Exclusive collaboration
We now study what happens if …rms can only form exclusive collaboration links. This may be due to explicit or implicit contracting requirements, or to highly competitive conditions that preclude several complementors from being willing to collaborate with the same …rm. In the light of our previous analysis, it is clear that the stable network that arises when collaboration is exclusive is g = g 3 . Under g = g 3 , there is no investment in improving the match with the complementor with which a …rm does not collaborate. As we showed earlier, this is not an outcome that arises owing to the exclusivity requirement, a noteworthy feature of the outcome when g = g 3 that …ts quite well with such a requirement (although it does depend on equaling 1). In addition, the facts that P 2 j=1 k j i (g 3 ) = P 2 j=1 k j i (g 1 ) and
imply that there is as much as total investment by each …rm in an equilibrium under exclusivity as when g = g 1 . However, all investment is now concentrated on the complementor with which a …rm collaborates, which is worse from the viewpoint of R&D costs because of their strict convexity. Gross pro…ts in the product market are the same both under g = g 1 and g = g 3 , since P 2 j=1 k j i (g 3 ) = P 2 j=1 k j i (g 1 ) and
As a result, it follows that X i (g 3 ) = Y j (g 3 ) < X i (g 1 ) = Y j (g 1 ) for i; j = 1; 2, and each …rm would be better o¤ if collaboration was forbidden or impossible.
Not only would …rms be better o¤ by forbidding collaboration, but also consumers as a whole would get a higher surplus. Thus, the price of a component is the same under g = g 1 and g = g 3 , and the extra gross utility attained by some consumers is exactly o¤set by the lower gross utility attained by the others. (This happens because, on the aggregate, consumers just care about total investment, which is the same under g = g 1 and g = g 3 .) However, transportation costs increase for consumers as a whole under g = g 3 because some systems are less appealing in their vertical attributes, and hence are bought less than under g = g 1 . In other words, the vertical di¤erences among some systems that arise under g = g 3 steal consumption away from systems that are preferred from a horizontal standpoint, thus generating some disutility that does not arise under g = g 1 . As a result, consumer welfare is greater under g = g 1 than g = g 3 , as are (net) pro…ts made by …rms. We then have the following result.
Proposition 3 Let t > 12=54 and suppose that collaborating with a complementor precludes a …rm from collaborating with the complementor's competitor. Then the unique (up to a relabeling of …rms) equilibrium network g = f1; 0; 0; 1g is socially suboptimal and results in a payo¤ for each …rm smaller than that achieved when g = f0; 0; 0; 0g.
Proof. Since forming a link costs " > 0 and X i (g 3 ) = Y j (g 3 ) < X i (g 1 ) = Y j (g 1 ) for i; j = 1; 2, it su¢ ces to show that consumer welfare under g = g 3 is smaller than under g = g 1 . Both for g = g 1 and g = g 3 , it holds that p X 1 = p X 2 = p Y 1 = p Y 2 = 3t=2, so p 11 = p 12 = p 21 = p 21 = 3t. In addition, the number of consumers purchasing system
However, the number of consumers purchasing systems X 1 Y 1 and X 2 Y 2 under g = g 3 is Q 11 (g 3 ) = Q 22 (g 3 ) = 1=4 + 1=(18t), whereas the number of consumers purchasing systems X 1 Y 2 and X 2 Y 1 under g = g 3 is
Taking into account that line l X i Y j (i; j = 1; 2) has a length of 1/2 and that there exists a unit mass of consumers uniformly spread all over the four existing lines, the aggregate consumer surplus under g = g 1 is
while the aggregate consumer surplus under g = g 3 is
Because CS(g 1 ) CS(g 3 ) = 1=(81t) > 0, the desired result follows.
Extensions
We now assume that collaborating with another …rm entails caring about the pro…t generated for such a …rm by the system in which both participate, a feature that is probably more realistic. Thus, if …rm X i collaborates with Y j , but not with Y 3 j , then …rm X i chooses k j i and k 3 j
). In turn, if …rm Y j collaborates with both X i and X 3 i , then …rm Y j chooses e i j and e 3 i j to maximize
. As before, we will let = 1 to simplify computations, even though results hold for any 2 (0; 1].
Our main result in this context coincides with the one derived before.
Proposition 4
For t > 11=36, the unique equilibrium network structure is the complete network, namely g = f1; 1; 1; 1g. In equilibrium, …rm X i chooses to invest k j i (g ) = 1=8 in improving the quality of its match with complementor Y j , whereas …rm Y j chooses to invest e i j (g ) = 1=8 in improving the quality of its match with complementor X i (i; j = 1; 2). Each …rm earns a payo¤ of (24t 1)=32, which is smaller than the payo¤ that each could achieve if all of them could commit not to collaborating.
Proof. See Appendix. Relative to Proposition 1, the fact that a …rm choosing its investment levels does not fully internalize the harm they provoke on its complementors implies that there is more investment and hence more ine¢ ciencies (from the …rms'viewpoints). It is worth noting that these results hold even if forming a collaboration link is not costly, so ine¢ ciencies are much severe in this setting.
To conclude, we show that results under exclusivity do not change when a …rm that collaborates with a complementor does not care about its entire pro…t but rather the pro…t that it makes from the system in which both …rms participate.
Proposition 5 Let t > 11=36 and suppose that collaborating with a complementor precludes a …rm from collaborating with the complementor's competitor. Then the unique (up to a relabeling of …rms) equilibrium network g = f1; 0; 0; 1g is socially suboptimal and results in a payo¤ for each …rm smaller than that achieved when g = f0; 0; 0; 0g.
Proof. Both for g = g 1 and g = g 3 , it holds that p X 1 = p X 2 = p Y 1 = p Y 2 = 3t=2, so p 11 = p 12 = p 21 = p 21 = 3t. In addition, the number of consumers purchasing system X i Y j (i; j = 1; 2) under g = g 1 is Q ij (g 1 ) = 1=4, so consumer surplus is Because this di¤erence exceeds CS(g 3 ) CS(g 1 ), we have that the equilibrium network under exclusivity is socially suboptimal. When t > 4, we have that
, so the fact that CS 0 (g 3 ) = CS(g 3 ) implies that the above proof goes through directly.
Conclusion
The locus of strategic interaction in many high-tech industries has broadened from the traditional competitive approach based on value capture towards one in which cooperative aspects with regards to value creation also play a critical role, as Brandenburger and Nalebu¤ (1996) emphasize. Not surprisingly, such "co-opetitive" settings display rich innovation ecosystems in which complementors collaborate with each other in R&D actitivities. This paper has shown that such rich innovation ecosystems may be an equilibrium phenomenon with disturbing properties for their members. In particular, we have shown that they may be an ine¢ cient outcome for competing …rms that can collaborate with complementors. They may also be ine¢ cient for society. These results hold under a variety of scenarios (e.g., regardless of whether or not collaboration exhibits exclusive features).
In this paper, we have abstracted away from dynamics to clarify our points, but there are many issues that have to do with dynamic variables. For example, collaboration may refer to the timing at which complementary products are brought to the market. Exploring this kind of issues seems promising enough to warrant further work on this completely unexplored area.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let g = g 1 and assume that t > 1=54 so that payo¤ functions are strictly concave and (equilibrium) investment levels, pro…ts and quantities sold of each system are nonnegative. Then we know that k 1 1 (g 1 ) = 1=12, k 2 1 (g 1 ) = 1=12, e 1 1 (g 1 ) = 1=12, e 2 1 (g 1 ) = 1=12, k 1 2 (g 1 ) = 1=12, k 2 2 (g 1 ) = 1=12, e 1 2 (g 1 ) = 1=12 and e 2 2 (g 1 ) = 1=12. In addition,
for all i; j = 1; 2.
We now consider g = g 2 under the assumption that t > 6=54 so that payo¤ functions are strictly concave and (equilibrium) investment levels, pro…ts and quantities sold of each system are nonnegative. Firm X 1 chooses k 1 1 and k 2 1 to maximize X 1 + 1
, whereas …rm X 2 chooses k 1 2 and k 2 2 to maximize X 2 C X 2 (k 1 2 ; k 2 2 ). In addition, …rm Y 1 chooses e 1 1 and e 2 1 to maximize
, whereas …rm Y 2 chooses e 1 2 and e 2 2 to maximize Y 2 C Y 2 (e 1 2 ; e 2 2 ). Then we have that k 1 1 (g 2 ) = 9t(180t 7) 2 + 648t(12t 1)
, k 2 1 (g 2 ) = 0, e 1 1 (g 2 ) = 9t(180t 7) 2 + 648t(12t 1)
, e 2 1 (g 2 ) = 0, k 1 2 (g 2 ) = 72t(9t 1) 2 + 648t(12t 1)
, k 2 2 (g 2 ) = 72t(9t 1) 2 + 648t(12t 1)
, e 1 2 (g 2 ) = 72t(9t 1) 2 + 648t(12t 1) and e 2 2 (g 2 ) = 27t 1 6(54t 2 )
. Also, X 1 (g 2 ) = 3tf4 + 243t[8t(67 + 18t(432t 73)) 9]g (2 + 648t(12t 1)) 2 , Y 1 (g 2 ) = 3tf4 + 243t[8t(67 + 18t(432t 73)) 9]g (2 + 648t(12t 1)) 2 X 2 (g 2 ) = 10368t 2 (54t 1)(9t 1) 2 (2 + 648t(12t 1)) 2 and Y 2 (g 2 ) = 10368t 2 (54t 1)(9t 1) 2 (2 + 648t(12t 1)) 2 .
We now let g = g 3 and assume that t > 11=36 so that payo¤ functions are strictly concave and (equilibrium) investment levels, pro…ts and quantities sold of each system are nonnegative, as usual. Firm X 1 chooses k 1 1 and k 2 1 to maximize X 1 + 1 X 1 (e 1 1 ) 2 C X 1 (k 1 1 ; k 2 1 ), whereas …rm X 2 chooses k 1 2 and k 2 2 to maximize X 2 + 2 X 2 (e 2 2 ) 2 C X 2 (k 1 2 ; k 2 2 ). In addition, …rm Y 1 chooses e 1 1 and e 2 1 to maximize Y 1 + 1 Y 1 (k 1 1 ) 2 C Y 1 (e 1 1 ; e 2 1 ), whereas …rm Y 2 chooses e 1 2 and e 2 2 to maximize Y 2 + 2 Y 2 (k 2 2 ) 2 C Y 2 (e 1 2 ; e 2 2 ). Then k 1 1 (g 3 ) = 15t 72t 2 , k 2 1 (g 3 ) = 0, e 1 1 (g 3 ) = 15t 72t 2 , e 2 1 (g 3 ) = 0, k 1 2 (g 3 ) = 0, k 2 2 (g 3 ) = 15t 72t 2 , e 1 2 (g 3 ) = 0 and e 2 2 (g 3 ) = 15t 72t 2
. In addition, we have that
3t(1296t 2 147t + 1) 4(36t 1) 2 for i; j = 1; 2.
We turn now to g = g 4 and assume that t > 13=108 so that payo¤ functions are strictly concave and (equilibrium) investment levels, pro…ts and quantities sold of each system are nonnegative. Firm X 1 chooses k 1 1 and k 2 1 to maximize X 1 + 1 X 1 (e 1 1 ) 2 + 2 X 1 (e 1 2 ) 2 C X 1 (k 1 1 ; k 2 1 ), whereas …rm X 2 chooses k 1 2 and k 2 2 to maximize X 2 C X 2 (k 1 2 ; k 2 2 ). In addition, …rm Y 1 chooses e 1 1 and e 2 1 to maximize Y 1 + 1 Y 1 (k 1 1 ) 2 C Y 1 (e 1 1 ; e 2 1 ), whereas …rm Y 2 chooses e 1 2 and e 2 2 to maximize Y 2 + 1 Y 2 (k 2 1 ) 2 C Y 2 (e 1 2 ; e 2 2 ). It then holds that k 1 1 (g 4 ) = 3(36t 1) 8(108t 7)
, k 2 1 (g 4 ) = 3(36t 1) 8( 108t 7) , e 1 1 (g 4 ) = 540t 17 24(108t 7)
, e 2 1 (g 4 ) = 0, k 1 2 (g 4 ) = 108t 13 12(108t 7)
, k 2 2 (g 4 ) = 108t 13 12(108t 7)
, e 1 2 (g 4 ) = 540t 17 24(108t 7)
and e 2 2 (g 4 ) = 0. This results in the following pro…ts: Let g = g 5 and assume that t > (71 + p 409)=432 so that payo¤ functions are strictly concave and (equilibrium) investment levels, pro…ts and quantities sold of each system are nonnegative. In this case, …rm X 1 chooses k 1 1 and k 2 1 to maximize X 1 + 1 X 1 (e 1 1 ) 2 + 2 X 1 (e 1 2 ) 2 C X 1 (k 1 1 ; k 2 1 ), whereas …rm X 2 chooses k 1 2 and k 2 2 to maximize X 2 + 2 X 2 (e 2 2 ) 2 C X 2 (k 1 2 ; k 2 2 ). In addition, …rm Y 1 chooses e 1 1 and e 2 1 to maximize
, whereas …rm Y 2 chooses e 1 2 and e 2 2 to maximize Y 2 + 1
. it holds that k 1 1 (g 5 ) = 5832t 2 675t 1 24(1944t 2 261t + 4)
, k 2 1 (g 5 ) = 27t(216t 25) 24(1944t 2 261t + 4)
, e 1 1 (g 5 ) = 9720t 2 1143t + 1 24(1944t 2 261t + 4)
, e 2 1 (g 5 ) = 0, k 1 2 (g 5 ) = 0, k 2 2 (g 5 ) = 9720t 2 1143t + 1 24(1944t 2 261t + 4)
, e 1 2 (g 5 ) =
27t(216t 25) 24(1944t 2 261t + 4) and e 2 2 (g 5 ) = 5832t 2 675t 1 24(1944t 2 261t + 4) .
All this results in the following pro…ts:
27tf31 + 54t[24t(871 + 216t(216t 55)) 341]g 1 576(4 + 9t(216t 29)) 2 and X 2 (g 5 ) = Y 1 (g 5 ) = 9tf5297 + 9t[5184t(196 + 27t(144t 55)) 50809]g 1 576(4 + 9t(216t 29)) 2 .
Finally, let g = g 6 and assume that t > 5=108 so that payo¤ functions are strictly concave and (equilibrium) investment levels, pro…ts and quantities sold of each system are nonnegative. Then k 1 1 (g 6 ) = 1=8, k 2 1 (g 6 ) = 1=8, e 1 1 (g 6 ) = 1=8, e 2 1 (g 6 ) = 1=8, k 1 2 (g 6 ) = 1=8, k 2 2 (g 6 ) = 1=8, e 1 2 (g 6 ) = 1=8 and e 2 2 (g 6 ) = 1=8. In addition, X i (g 6 ) = Y j (g 6 ) = 24t 1 32 for all i; j = 1; 2.
We now show that the unique equilibrium network is g = g 6 if it holds that t > 11=36. Note …rst that, since X 1 (g 2 ) = Y 1 (g 2 ) > Y 1 (g 1 ) = X 1 (g 1 ), it follows that X 1 (g 2 ) X 1 (g 1 ) does not imply that Y 1 (g 2 ) < Y 1 (g 1 ), and hence g = g 1 cannot be a stable network. In addition, the fact that X 2 (g 3 ) = Y 2 (g 3 ) > Y 2 (g 2 ) = X 2 (g 2 ) yields that X 2 (g 3 ) X 2 (g 2 ) does not imply that Y 2 (g 3 ) < Y 2 (g 2 ), and hence g = g 2 cannot be a stable network either. Because X 1 (g 5 ) = Y 2 (g 5 ) > Y 2 (g 3 ) = X 1 (g 3 ), it also follows that X 1 (g 5 ) X 1 (g 3 ) does not imply that Y 2 (g 5 ) < Y 2 (g 3 ), which shows that g = g 3 cannot be a stable network. To show that the same applies to network g = g 4 , note that it holds that X 2 (g 5 ) > X 2 (g 4 ) and Y 2 (g 5 ) > Y 2 (g 4 ) so it follows that X 2 (g 5 ) X 2 (g 4 ) does not imply that Y 2 (g 5 ) < Y 2 (g 4 ), which shows that g = g 4 cannot be a stable network. Because it also holds that X 2 (g 6 ) > X 2 (g 5 ) and Y 1 (g 6 ) > Y 1 (g 5 ), we have that X 2 (g 6 ) X 2 (g 5 ) does not imply that Y 1 (g 6 ) < Y 1 (g 5 ), and hence g = g 5 cannot be a stable network. The fact that X i (g 6 ) > X i (g 5 ) for i = 1; 2 and Y j (g 6 ) > Y j (g 5 ) for j = 1; 2 implies that g = g 6 is an equilibrium network for t > 11=36.
